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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dale Patterson pied guilty to two counts of 
delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), as well as a sentencing 
enhancement (five years fixed) under I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(1) for having a prior conviction 
for a similar offense. The district court interpreted I.C. § 37-27398 as creating a true 
mandatory minimum sentence and, therefore, it ruled that it had no discretion to 
suspend the five year fixed sentence, or retain jurisdiction over Mr. Patterson. 
Ultimately, it imposed two concurrent unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed. The district court explained that, in its view, the fixed portion of those sentences 
was required under section 37-27398 but, even if such a mandatory minimum did not 
exist, it would have exercised its discretion in favor of the sentence ultimately given. 
Mr. Patterson appeals. He argues first that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing, and ordering into execution, the sentence that it did. As part of this 
argument, he contends that, given the record in this case, the district court should have 
granted him an opportunity to earn a chance at probation by placing him in the retained 
jurisdiction ("rider") program. Mr. Patterson also argues that the district court erred in 
concluding that a rider was not a legal sentencing option in this case. 
Mr. Patterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider. Alternatively, he requests that 
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence or remand his case for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Dale Patterson is a drug addict. (Interviewer's Assessment, p.4 (Mar. 13, 2008).) 
He started drinking and smoking marijuana when he was only ten years old. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.) As a teen, Mr. Patterson 
smoked marijuana "all the time," began using cocaine heavily and, in his late teens, 
even started using methamphetamine. (PSI, p.9.) 
In 1989, when he was 22 years old, Mr. Patterson completed a 28-day residential 
treatment program at ARA House in Idaho Falls for his cocaine addiction. (Interviewer's 
Assessment, pp.1, 2, 3 (Mar. 13, 2008).) It appears that that program helped 
Mr. Patterson overcome his cocaine addiction; however, he did continue to use 
marijuana and, obviously, methamphetamine after completing the program. (See 
Interviewer's Assessment, pp. 2, 4 (Mar. 13, 2008).) 
In 2001, at the age of 35, Mr. Patterson was convicted of a single count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (PSI, p.5.) The record does 
not reveal what that controlled substance was, but one would guess that it was 
methamphetamine. Mr. Patterson received a unified sentence of seven years, with 
three years fixed for that offense. (PSI, p.5.) After serving his fixed time, Mr. Patterson 
was paroled in August of 2003. (PSI, p.5.) He stayed clean at least until he was 
discharged from parole in September of 2005. (PSI, p.5; see PSI, p.9.) 
Sadly, in 2007, after six years of sobriety, including more than a year where he 
was not supervised by the State in any way, Mr. Patterson relapsed and began using 
methamphetamine again. (PSI, pp.3, 9, 10.) Immediately, his methamphetamine use 
became a daily habit and, before long, he was injecting it intravenously. (PSI, p.9.) In 
2 
order to support his methamphetamine addiction, Mr. Patterson then began to sell 
drugs. (Sent. Tr., p.34, Ls.19-21; PSI, p.3.) 
On October 4 and 12, 2007, Mr. Patterson sold small amounts (2.5 grams and 
2.3 grams, respectively) of methamphetamine 1 to a confidential informant and/or an 
undercover police officer. (R., pp.18-19; Plea Tr., p.11, L.7-p.13, L.5.) 
On January 14, 2008, Mr. Patterson was charged with two counts of delivery of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.13-16.) As to each of the two 
counts, he was also charged with two separate sentencing enhancements-one for 
delivering methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school (I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(2)), and 
one for having been previously convicted of delivery of a controlled substance 
(I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(i)). 
After Mr. Patterson waived his preliminary hearing (R., pp.29, 30), he was bound 
over into the district court (R., p.31 ). The State filed its Information on February 20, 
2008. (R., pp.32-35.) 
At some point, Mr. Patterson's bond was reduced (R., pp.39-41) such that he 
was apparently. able to bond out of jail on certain conditions, including the requirement 
that he submit to drug testing (urinalyses) three times per week. (See R., pp.48, 87; 
Plea Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.4.) 
1 The amounts of methamphetamine sold were each slightly more than a "teener," 
a sixteenth of an ounce. City of Boise Website (available at<http://www. 
cityofboise.org/Departments/Police/DrugEducationAndResources/Drugldentification/pag 
e5807.aspx>). It is probably safe to label a teener as a "personal use" amount, given 
that Mr. Patterson used an "8 ball," an eighth of an ounce, or twice as much as a teener, 
the last time he used methamphetamine, i.e., the day he was arrested. (See 
Interviewer's Assessment, p.1 (Mar. 13, 2008).) 
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On March 20, 2008, while Mr. Patterson was out on bond, he voluntarily began 
attending Intensive Outpatient ("IOP") Treatment at the Walker Center in Gooding. 
(R., p.87; Interviewer's Assessment, p.1 (Mar. 13, 2008).) A progress report, covering 
the period from April 7, 2008, through May 7, 2008, indicated that, to that point, 
Mr. Patterson had attended all of his group sessions and actively participated in those 
sessions in a positive way, and was making progress toward his goal of sober living. 
(Walker Center Outpatient Program Monthly Progress Report (May 7, 2008).) He 
successfully completed the IOP program on May 28, 2008. (R., p.87.) Afterward, 
Walker Center staff described the progress that Mr. Patterson had made in the program, 
explaining that he had "internalized his motivation for remaining clean and sober," 
"place[d] his recovery as a top priority in his life," "expressed accountability and 
accepted responsibility for his actions," and "still attend[ed] treatment and [did] 
everything he could to be stable in his recovery" despite the ongoing distraction of his 
criminal case. (R., p.87.) 
In the meantime, on or about May 5, 2008, Mr. Patterson entered into a plea 
agreement with the State. (See R., p.59.) Under the terms of that agreement, 
Mr. Patterson agreed to plead guilty to both counts of delivery of a controlled substance, 
as well as one of the two enhancements for having a prior drug-related conviction. 
(R., p.59.) In exchange, the State agreed to: (1) dismiss the second enhancement for 
the prior conviction, as well as both school zone-based enhancements; (2) refrain from 
filing a persistent violator enhancement or any additional charges relating to the search 
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of Mr. Patterson's camp trailer the day after he was arrested2; and (3) recommend a 
sentence of no more than fifteen years, with seven years fixed. (R., p.59.) 
As noted, Mr. Patterson completed the IOP program on May 28, 2008. 
Thereafter, he began attending Men's Relapse Prevention, a program which 
presumably continued through the time of his June 16, 2008 sentencing hearing.3 (See 
R., p.87.) 
As of the time of Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, he had substantially 
complied with the terms of his release-appearing for all appointments in a timely 
fashion, participating in all required drug tests,4 and testing negative for drugs and 
alcohol.5 (R., p.89.) In addition to this information, the district court had before it the 
PSI, detailing Mr. Patterson's history of addiction, as well as some of his recent 
progress (see PSI, pp.9-10; Interviewer's Assessment (Mar. 13, 2008); Walker Center 
Outpatient Program Monthly Progress Report (May 7, 2008)), a letter from the Walker 
Center discussing Mr. Patterson's completion of the IOP program and success in 
treatment as of the time of sentencing (see R., p.87), and letters of support from his 
2 In the search of Mr. Patterson's camp trailer, the police found "several clear baggies 
containing a white residue" believed by the police to be methamphetamine, a pipe 
containing a white residue, empty plastic bags, and certain materials and equipment 
that were consistent with the making of "crystal MSM, which is a cutting agent for 
methamphetamine." (R., pp.94-95.) When Mr. Patterson was confronted with the 
evidence found in his camp trailer, he admitted that an unidentified individual had 
attempted to bring a portable meth lab into his trailer at one point, but that Mr. Patterson 
had kicked him out. (R., pp.95-96.) Although Mr. Patterson admitted to making MSM, 
he denied ever making, or attempting to make, methamphetamine. (R., pp.95-96.) 
3 Apparently, Mr. Patterson was on a waiting list for a 28-day inpatient treatment 
program (see Plea Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.24), but it does not appear that space in that 
program opened up prior to his sentencing hearing. 
4 After his initial success while out on bond, the district court reduced the drug testing 
requirement to two times per week. (Plea Tr., p.15, L.19- p.16, L.4.) 
5 
cousin and his daughter.6 His cousin's letter informed the district court that 
Mr. Patterson is a "good father" who "loves his children very much." (Letter from Anne 
Dinrnan to Judge Bevan, p.1 (undated).) His eleven year-old daughter's7 letter bears 
this out: 
I love my father with all of my heart. l miss him terribly right now. If 
he goes away even longer then you cannot imagine how much I'll miss 
him. Every time I just think about him not being with me and my family I 
cry. Every time I think a srnidge about him then I [bawl]. . . . I really love 
him and I just want to be able to say my dad lives with me. . . . I love my 
daddy to[o] much to lose him. I need him in my life . . . . My life is so 
completely empty. Please don't let me [lose] him as much as I already 
have. . . . Please send him to rehab so he can by my superdad again. 
Tell him I love him with all my heart and always will .... 
(Letter from Chelsea Patterson to Judge Bevan, p.1 (undated).) 
At the hearing, Mr. Patterson offered statements from four witnesses in 
mitigation. (See Sent. Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.13, L.10.) Greg Avery, Mr. Patterson's sponsor, 
spoke of Mr. Patterson's success in the Crystal Meth Anonymous program, his progress 
in dealing with "the issues that caused him to use," his intense desire to succeed in 
recovery this time, his faith, and his work skills and ability to be a productive member of 
society. (Sent. Tr., p.8, L. 13 - p.9, L.22.) Scott Flinn, an addict with 14 years of 
sobriety behind him, discussed the change in Mr. Patterson's attitude and he suggested 
that such change is critical to the recovery process and, thus, bodes very well for 
Mr. Patterson. (See Sent. Tr., p.10, L.6 - p.11, L.3.) Larry Featherston, Jr., 
Mr. Patterson's boss at Horne Heating & Air Condition, offered a glowing assessment of 
Mr. Patterson, describing Mr. Patterson's forthrightness about his addiction, and 
5 The only requirement that Mr. Patterson failed to fully satisfy was the obligation to pay 
all Court Compliance Program fees. (R., p.89.) 
6 The letters are attached to the PSI. 
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explaining what an asset Mr. Patterson was to the company. (Sent. Tr., p.11, L.14 -
p.12, L.4.) Mr. Featherston described Mr. Patterson at different times as a "tremendous 
worker" and an "awesome worker."8 (Sent. Tr., p.11, L.14 - p.12, L.4.) Finally, Cindy 
Bennett, Mr. Patterson's sister, spoke. (Sent. Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.13, L.10.) Just as her 
cousin's letter had done, she described her brother as "an excellent father when he's 
not on drugs," commenting that "[h]e's just there for his kids, and that's what they need." 
(Sent. Tr., p.12, L.14 - p.13, L.10.) She also explained that the children's mother was 
not a part of their lives and, a result, she (Ms. Bennett), a single parent herself, was 
struggling to care for Mr. Patterson's children in addition to her own. (Sent. Tr., p.12, 
L.20 - p.13, L.3.) 
Despite Mr. Patterson's history of addiction, the role that it played in the present 
offenses, his desire to break the chains of that addiction, and his recent successes in 
beginning to do so, and despite the importance of Mr. Patterson to his sister and, most 
importantly, his children, the district court denied defense counsel's request for a "rider" 
(Sent. Tr., p.23, Ls.15-18), i.e., a period of retained jurisdiction.9 Instead, the district 
7 Mr. Patterson has two children, a boy and a girl. (PSI, p.7.) They were twelve and 
eleven years old, respectively, at the time of Mr. Patterson's sentencing. (PSI, p.7.) 
8 Mr. Featherston's remarks in open court were consistent with what he told the pre-
sentence investigator about Mr. Patterson. On that earlier occasion, Mr. Featherston 
had described Mr. Patterson's job performance as "awesome" and had written as 
follows: "He's very punctual & knows his job. He's an asset to our installation team. We 
are hoping he will remain a full time employee." (PSI, p.9.) Notably, this is consistent 
with what another former employer had recalled about him (even though he had not 
worked for her since 1999)-she described him as a "good employee" and a "hard 
worker," and had noted that "the crews liked him on job sites for his quality work." (PSI, 
f-9.) 
The district court ruled that a rider was not an option given the "mandatory minimum" 
of I.C. § 37-2739B. (Sent. Tr., p.31, L.3 - p.33, L.10.) The district court further ruled, 
however, that, even if it did have discretion to grant Mr. Patterson a rider, it would not do 
so. (Sent. Tr., p.33, L.11 - p.36, L.25.) 
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court imposed two concurrent unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
(R., p.108; Sent. Tr., p.37, Ls.3-11.) In doing so, the district court acknowledged, at 
least to a certain extent, the devastating impact its sentencing decision would have on 
Mr. Patterson's children, but concluded, apparently, that the "greater good" of "sending 
a message" to drug addicts outweighed that impact. (See Sent. Tr., p.35, L.14 - p.37, 
L.11.) 
On June 17, 2008, the district court entered its written judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.104-10.) Ten days later, on June 30, 2008, Mr. Patterson filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.119-21.) On appeal, Mr. Patterson contends that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion by imposing upon him a sentence which is excessive 
given any view of the facts. He further contends that the district court erred in ruling that 
neither a rider, nor a suspended sentence, is legally permissible upon imposition of a 
"fixed minimum" sentence under I.C. § 37-2739B, and that this Court may, in fact, 
remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider. Mr. Patterson respectfully 
requests that this Court do just that, so that he may have an opportunity to earn a 
chance at probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate 
portion of his sentence or remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing upon 
Mr. Patterson a sentence which is excessive given any view of the facts? 
2. May a defendant receive retained jurisdiction, or a suspended sentence, upon 




The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Patterson A 
Sentence Which Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts 
Mr. Patterson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his concurrent unified 
sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 
(1979)). Mr. Patterson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Patterson must 
show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any 
view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 
(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 
(1992)). The governing criteria are derived from the four objectives of criminal 
punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). 
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This Court reviews the length of the entire sentence in order to determine whether the 
sentence is reasonable. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 725, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
As noted above, Mr. Patterson is a drug addict, and the district court specifically 
found that his addiction factored prominently in the perpetration of the present offenses. 
(Sent. Tr., p.34, Ls.19-21.) Both of these are facts which the Idaho courts have long 
considered mitigating circumstances counseling toward lesser sentences. See, e.g., 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91, 645 P.2d 323, 325 ("[T]he trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the 
problem."). In addition, not only has Mr. Patterson voiced his acceptance of 
responsibility for his actions and his willingness to overcome his addiction, 10 but, as 
described above, he has actually "walked the walk" by voluntarily seeking out treatment, 
working hard to stay sober, and meeting with a great deal of success in doing so. This 
is another well-established mitigating factor which counsels toward a lesser sentence. 
See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529 (1982) (noting that 
"since the incident and incarceration pending hearing, he has markedly changed his 
dependency on prescription medication, with great improvement in his mental attitude 
and stability," and holding that this factor, among others rendered the defendant's 
sentence excessive). 
10 Mr. Patterson told the pre-sentence investigator that his actions were "stupid" and that 
he is willing to accept responsibility for them. (PSI, pp.3, 10.) He went on to explain 
that he recognizes that he was foolish to think he could overcome his addiction on his 
own, that he needs, and is willing to accept support from his church, professional 
treatment providers, and his sponsor. (PSI, pp.3, 10.) Finally, he has made it clear that 
he is committed to changing his life. (PSI, p.10.) 
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In light of these facts, and looking at Mr. Patterson's case as a whole, it is clear 
that his concurrent sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, are excessive. The 
four objectives of criminal punishment are not well-served by warehousing 
Mr. Patterson for at least the next five years; society will be best served if Mr. Patterson 
is treated and allowed to become a contributing member as soon as possible. Indeed, 
prison may very well hamper Mr. Patterson's recovery (which is especially tragic in this 
case because he was doing so well prior to his sentencing hearing) and, thus, may 
actually increase the risk to society. Moreover, while the district court was clearly very 
concerned with both general and specific deterrence when it sentenced Mr. Patterson to 
prison (see Sent. Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.36, L.5), one must seriously question the district 
court's logic. With all due respect to the district court, it was naive to believe that a 
prison sentence in this case will have any impact whatsoever on addicts who, because 
of the nature of their addictions, lack the ability to make decisions that are in their best 
long-term interests. 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Patterson asks this Court to hold that the district 
court's sentence represents an abuse of discretion, and to vacate that sentence. He 
requests that this Court remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider or, in 
the alternative, that it reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence or remand his 
case for a new sentencing hearing. 
II. 
A Defendant May Receive Retained Jurisdiction, Or A Suspended Sentence, Upon 
Imposition Of A "Fixed Minimum" Sentence Pursuant To I.C. § 37-2739B 
As noted, Mr. Patterson requests that, in the event that this Court concludes that 
the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a unified sentence of 
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fifteen years, with five years fixed, this Court remand the case with an order that 
Mr. Patterson be granted a rider. This request raises the question of whether a rider is 
even legally permissible in this case. Mr. Patterson contends that it is, and that the 
district court erred when it ruled otherwise. 
As noted, Mr. Patterson pied guilty, not only to the two charged offenses, but also 
to one of the four charged sentencing enhancements-one of the two enhancements 
arising out of his prior drug conviction. That sentencing enhancement provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
37-27398. Fixed minimum sentences in drug cases . ... 
(b) Any person who is found guilty of violating the provisions of 
section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of any attempt to conspiracy to 
commit such a crime, may be sentenced to a fixed minimum term of 
confinement to the custody of the state board of correction, which term 
shall be at least five (5) years and may extend to life, for each of the 
following aggravating factors found by the trier of fact: 
(1) That the defendant has previously been found guilty of or 
convicted of a violation of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or 
of an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, or an offense 
committed in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this 
jurisdiction, would be punishable as a violation of section 37-
2732(a)( 1 )(A), Idaho Code, or as an attempt or conspiracy to 
commit such an offense. 
(c) During a fixed minimum term of confinement imposed 
under this section, the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge 
or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct except for meritorious 
service. Each fixed minimum term imposed shall be served consecutively 
to the others, and consecutively to any minimum term of confinement 
imposed for the substantive offense. 
I.C. § 37-2739B. Notably, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, despite the 
statute's use of the word "may" instead of "shall," section 37-2739B is mandatory. 
State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 918-19, 935 P.2d 174, 181-82 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Prior to Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, he filed a Sentencing Memorandum 
arguing that section 37-2732B did not foreclose the possibility of him receiving a rider. 
(R., pp.75-84.) His argument was that, even if section 37-2732B is mandatory, in the 
sense that it requires the district court to impose the minimum fixed sentence (as the 
Court of Appeals held in Ayaia), nothing in that provision requires the district court to 
order that sentence into execution. (R., pp.75-84.) He compared section 37-2732B to 
I.C. § 19-2514 and argued that, under the rule of lenity, section 37-2732B should not be 
read to impose a harsher penalty than its plain language would dictate. (R., pp.75-84.) 
At Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, the district court heard arguments on 
whether a rider was permissible under section 37-2739B. (See Sent. Tr., p.4, L.24 -
p.5, L.16, p.14, L.23 - p.19, L.2, p.23, L.15 - p.24, L.17.) Ultimately, although the 
district court made it clear that it was not inclined to grant a rider anyway, it sided with 
the State, ruling that section 37-2739B does not permit the district court to retain 
jurisdiction. (See Sent. Tr., p.31, L.3- p.33, L.16, p.36, Ls.3-5, p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.3.) 
However, the district court did concede that this is an area of the law that is less than 
clear, and it encouraged Mr. Patterson to seek appellate review of the issue. (Sent. 
Tr., p.37, Ls.20-24.) 
Mr. Patterson now contends that the district court's ruling was in error because, 
in fact, nothing in section 37-2739B precludes a district court from imposing a fixed 
. minimum sentence and either retaining jurisdiction (with the possibility of later 
suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on probation) or immediately 
suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on probation. In other words, even 
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if section 37-27398 requires the district court to impose a fixed minimum sentence, 
nothing in that section requires the district court to order that sentence into execution. 
As defense counsel below observed, a look at Idaho's persistent violator statute, 
I.C. § 19-2514, is instructive. That statute is worded similarly to section 37-27398 in 
that it provides that a person convicted of his or her third felony "shall be sentenced to a 
term . . . for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life." 
I.C. § 19-2514. And that statute has been interpreted to allow the sentencing court to 
suspend the imposed sentence and place the defendant on probation. State v. 
Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566-67, 990 P.2d 144,147-48 (Ct. App. 1999). The Court in 
that case held that "[w]here there has been no legislative action declaring a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment, thusly canceling a court's power to suspend sentences, 
such power to suspend should be preserved." Id. at 566 n.5, 990 P.2d at 147 n.5. 
Therefore, under the rule of lenity, which dictates that ambiguities in statutes must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant, the persistent violator statute could not be construed 
as requiring a mandatory minimum sentence where the Legislature did not expressly 
call for it. Id. 
Notably, section 37-2739B, and its analoge, Idaho's persistent violator statute, 
differ markedly from Idaho's true mandatory minimum requirements, which explicitly 
state that the district court does not have discretion to suspend imposition of sentence 
or grant the defendant a rider. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 19-2520G (imposing a five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for certain repeat sex offenders, and specifically stating 
that "[a] court shall not have the power to suspend, withhold, retain jurisdiction, or 
commute a mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to this section"); 
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37-27328(a) (imposing various mandatory minimum fixed sentences for drug trafficking, 
and specifically stating that "adjudication of guilt or the imposition or execution of 
sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"). When one compares section 
37-27398 the persistent violator statute to the true mandatory minimums provided for 
under Idaho law, it becomes clear that, had the Legislature intended to prohibit 
sentencing judges from granting riders or suspending sentences under the former 
statutes, it would have said so. Since the Idaho Legislature did not say so in drafting 
section 37-27398, sentencing courts imposing the fixed minimum sentences provided 
for therein retain their discretion to grant defendants riders and suspend their 
sentences. Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in ruling that 
it had no discretion to grant Mr. Patterson a rider in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Patterson respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand his case with an instruction that he be granted a rider 
and, thus, given an opportunity to earn a chance to be placed on probation. 
Alternatively, if this Court determines that a rider is not possible in this case, he 
requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence, or that it find 
that his current sentence is excessive and remand his case for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2009. 
ERIK R. HTINEN 
Deputy t te Appellate Public Defender 
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